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Abstract 
There are many competing and complementary applications of ideas of uncertainty and in this 
chapter we outline these as well as showing how the key themes arising across the chapters interlink 
and provide a picture of the impacts of uncertainty on fringe ideological movements. The chapter 
compares and contrasts themes from the chapters focusing on religious groups with those on secular 
groups, demonstrating both the similarities in issues and responses as well as what can be seen to be 
unique about religious responses to uncertainty. It also highlights how uncertainty can be variously 
conceived, both in the theoretical study and experience of these groups, in the shape of external 
threats, such as legal pressures, and internal change, such as theological innovation, or the death of 
a founder. Whilst each of the chapters that follow will stand on their own merits, this chapter both 
guides the reader through how they contribute to a cohesive whole, whilst also serving as an 
introductory guide to the problem of uncertainty as an everyday experience for individuals and 
groups, with a particular focus on minority religions. 
 
Introduction 
The release of the poisonous nerve agent, sarin, on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 brought the 
Japanese new religion, Aum Shinrikyo, to global attention.1 This was the first known use by a non-
state actor of a weapon of mass destruction. The incident led to a lengthy police investigation in 
Japan itself, an examination by law enforcement agencies elsewhere of how Aum had been able to 
acquire, develop and use a chemical weapon, and to extensive academic research on how and why 
Aum had progressed from being a peaceful yoga group in the mid-1980s to a terrorist millennial 
movement eleven years on. As later became clear, the subway incident turned out to have been the 
latest in a series of violent acts, beginning with member beatings and the murder of an internal 
critic, and progressing to the production of biological weapons, the purchase of military hardware, 
an attempt to acquire the Ebola virus, and the successful manufacture and release of sarin gas.  
                                                          
1 This account of Aum Shinrikyo is based on a case study by Knott et al (2014), supplemented with information from 
Reader (2000). See also Baffelli, in this volume. 
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Aum was one of a number of new Japanese religious movements operating in a competitive 
religious market in which charismatic leadership, media interest, and apocalyptic teachings were the 
norm rather than the exception. With Asahara Shoko as its founder and theocratic leader, it had a 
centralised hierarchical structure based on spiritual accomplishment and, in the early 1990s, a 
predominantly young, well-educated membership of about 10,000. However, by that time, 
Asahara’s lectures and writings, which had once been optimistic about the group’s potential for 
mass membership and universal salvation, were becoming steadily more pessimistic, world-
rejecting, and apocalyptic. His leadership was increasingly fragile, as the goals he had set for the 
group proved impossible to meet. Failure to expand the movement as planned, public rejection at 
the 1990 Japanese parliamentary election, and negative media attention, added to mounting hostility 
to the world at large, and led to increasing feelings of paranoia and perceptions of persecution. 
Aum’s inner core of members had not only renounced their families and isolated themselves from 
wider society, they were practising extreme asceticism, displaying unswerving commitment to 
Asahara, and embracing his vision of an imminent cosmic battle between Aum and the forces of 
evil. 
In the context of these structural, social and ideological conditions, only a minor catalyst was 
needed to trigger a major act of violence. Asahara and his senior members, on becoming aware of 
an impending police raid and, perhaps in the hope of averting it, made the decision to attack the 
Tokyo subway, killing thirteen and injuring thousands. 
As is often the case for those who decide to join, remain in or defect from religious and other 
ideological movements, personal uncertainties may be a driving factor. And, within established 
groups, external and internal conditions and events may create uncertainty for individual members 
and leaders which may then have significant personal and collective consequences, and even – as in 
the case of Aum – wider public ramifications. Scholarly accounts of the rise and fall of Aum 
Shinrikyo and its path to apocalyptic violence have attested to the various ways in which 
uncertainties affected the beliefs, feelings and actions of individuals and the group as a whole.  
 
What do we mean by uncertainty and minority religions? 
Contributors to this volume first came together as participants in a seminar and book symposium in 
February 2015. These events had been jointly organised by INFORM, the Information Network on 
Religious Movements, and a team at Lancaster University researching the role of ideologies, beliefs 
and commitments in decision-making and the move to violence, as part of the ‘Global Uncertainties 
Programme’ (funded by the UK Research Councils). Set up to examine the causes of insecurity and 
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the prediction, prevention and management of security risks and threats, the Programme focused on 
major areas such as terrorism, organised crime, threats to national infrastructure, natural disasters, 
and their associated social and cultural drivers and consequences. Although uncertainty was never 
formally defined, the list of issues to be investigated reflected a view current at the time, that 
societies, nation states, global institutions and the environment faced unprecedented and 
unpredictable threats to their order and stability. In the wake of 9/11, the financial crisis of 2008, 
climate change and global migration, individuals were faced with what Zygmunt Bauman (2007) 
had referred to as ‘endemic uncertainty’, a time of volatility, fear, fragmentation and change, 
requiring ceaseless adaptability, mobility and creativity from citizens.  
A discussion of the scope and meaning of our key concept would be incomplete without mentioning 
‘certainty’, a word which simultaneously refers to a quality, a conviction and an event or fact. It is 
the quality or state of surety, of being reliably true; it is the conviction that something is assuredly 
the case; and is something that in all probability is going to happen. ‘Uncertainty’ reverses all that 
assurance, reliability, conviction and probability, and replaces them with instability, ambivalence, 
unpredictability and the unknown. In this book, we use the terms ‘uncertain’, ‘uncertainty’ and 
‘uncertainties’ to refer (a) to situations, contexts and events in which the circumstances and 
outcomes are unclear, cannot be fully known, or are disputed, and (b) to individuals’ cognitive, 
affective and practical experiences, feelings and behaviours in the face of the unknown.  
Later in the chapter, we will discuss the uncertainties experienced by religious and other ideological 
minorities and develop a model of their responses to them. In doing so we will draw on other 
relevant attempts at categorisation. Both Wessinger (2000a) and Walliss (2004) offer models for 
distinguishing between millennial groups (those that hope for imminent salvation in the face of 
worldly suffering) and the factors that inform their beliefs and, in some cases violent, actions. We 
will return to these below. By contrast, Tannert et al (2007: 893-894), in their work on the ethics of 
research and decision-making, offer a taxonomy of uncertainty. They distinguish between objective 
and subjective types of uncertainty, further sub-dividing the former into epistemological and 
ontological uncertainties, and the latter into moral and rule uncertainties. Each of these sub-types, 
they write, ‘describes a particular type of mismatch between the knowledge required and the 
knowledge available for rational decision-making’ (Tannert et al 2007: 893). Their taxonomy is 
useful in showing how uncertainty can be further sub-divided, although, as will become evident, 
other authors and contributors to the book have their own ways of doing so.  
In their accounts of how groups and the individuals within them have acted, thought and felt as a 
consequence of uncertainty, these authors and those writing for this volume have brought other 
terms into play. They have used concepts relating to structural issues, such as ‘instability’ and 
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‘unpredictability’; and to others relating to existential and physical conditions, such as ‘insecurity’, 
‘precarity’, ‘volatility’ and ‘fragility’. With reference to decision-making, ‘risk’ and ‘riskiness’ 
make an appearance, with synonyms for uncertainty such as ‘ambivalence’, ‘doubt’ and ‘dilemma’ 
also employed. On the affective side, uncertainty is often bound up with, and thus hard to 
differentiate from, feelings such as fear, confusion and anxiety. ‘Dissonance’ is used by several 
authors, drawing on Leon Festinger’s (1957) concept of ‘cognitive dissonance’, the psychological 
stress experienced by someone who attempts to hold together inconsistent or contradictory beliefs 
or views. In this sense, dissonance may be both a manifestation of the experience of uncertainty as 
well as a cause of further doubt. In some cases, authors have referred to ‘failure’, to the breakdown 
or fragmentation of a group, its inability to achieve its goals or expectations, the demise of a leader, 
or the non-fulfilment of prophecy. On the one hand, such failures are likely to have been brought 
about by uncertainty; on the other, they then generate further uncertainties in the group that lead to 
other unforeseen consequences. 
In the book’s title, we refer to ‘minority religions’, with due deference to the title of the Inform 
book series in which this volume appears. However, a quick scan of the contents page will reveal 
the presence of apparently non-religious groups alongside religious ones. We have taken the view 
that religious and non-religious ideological minorities have more in common than not. Like 
Wessinger (2000b: 7-8), whose edited volume on millennialism includes revolutionary political 
movements as well as avowedly religious ones, we assert that valuable comparisons can be made 
between different types of groups which nevertheless display a commitment to a mission or ultimate 
concern. They all hold deeply-embedded, non-negotiable beliefs, ideals and values (Francis 2011, 
Knott 2013). They ascribe objects, events, places and sources of knowledge or tradition with sacred 
status, though their understanding of the sacred will depend on their own ideological context (for 
example, of nationalism, secularism, Buddhism, environmentalism or Islam). They experience and 
respond to uncertainties, and find solutions to them.  
Following the precedent set by Inform and by earlier volumes in its book series, in this collection 
we have included chapters by scholars with current or prior personal experience of minority 
religions as well as those who research them as informed outsiders. Martin Weightman, Francis 
Stewart and Angela Burt have reflected insider knowledge and insights on Scientology, Straight 
Edge Punk and the International Society for Krishna Consciousness in their contributions. 
In the remainder of this introduction, with reference to the sociological and psychological literature 
and to the findings offered by the book’s contributors, we will answer the following overarching 
question: What happens when individuals and groups face uncertainties, and how do they go about 
resolving them? We will give due consideration to individuals who join religious and other 
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ideological groups and to the groups themselves. With reference to a range of historical and 
contemporary cases, we will address a series of subsidiary questions. 
• Are individuals whose circumstances are uncertain, who experience doubts or feel anxious 
about their identities or place in the world, attracted to religious or other ideological groups, 
and if so what kinds of groups attract them?  
• What happens when religious and other ideological groups are confronted by uncertainties, 
whether external or internal? What is the nature of those uncertainties? How do groups and 
their members respond?  
• What types of solutions do they come up with? Is there a relationship between the type of 
uncertainty faced and the solutions sought? 
In the following pages we make the case for using the frame of uncertainty for an analysis of 
religious and other ideological minorities and the decisions, thoughts, feelings and actions of their 
leaders and members. Although it is impossible for us to treat these issues with the time and space 
they deserve, we make a start by mapping the relevant terrain. In the next section we discuss several 
areas in sociology and social psychology in which religion, meaning-making and extremism have 
been discussed in relation to certainty and uncertainty, before turning to the contents of the book 
and the contribution of its authors. 
Uncertainty and religion: the literature 
As Kim Knibbe (2014: 538) notes in an article on certainty and uncertainty in contemporary 
spirituality and Catholicism, ‘religion is popularly seen as the site par excellence where people look 
for certainties and solutions, even where none seem possible’.  
In the sociology of religion, religion is often interpreted as a reaction to social and 
cultural change: whether it is a fundamentalist type of religion, where certainty and 
authority are, at least ostensibly, located in ancient texts that provide a defence against 
modernity and globalization […] or a ‘subjectified’ religion, where truth is anchored in 
personal experiences of whatever is considered to be sacred [...] Both are interpreted as 
strategies for re-creating a basis of religious knowledge and authority and dealing with 
uncertainty. (Knibbe 2014: 538) 
Knibbe (2014; cf. Claverie & Fedele 2014) goes on to counter such claims in a comparative study 
of a spiritualist group and liberal Catholic pastoral centre in the Netherlands. Her critical point is 
apposite, however. Religion is more often than not taken to be a site of refuge from personal and 
collective uncertainties, a haven apart from society’s increasing fragmentation and unpredictability. 
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However, seen from the perspective of some religious insiders, what religions and spiritualities may 
offer is not so much certainty in and of itself as the opportunity to make sense of uncertainty and to 
learn to live with it. As Knibbe (2014: 547) concluded in her Dutch study, spiritualists and liberal 
Catholics were primarily concerned to understand and work with the boundary between what could 
be known and controlled and what could not. The former, however, veered more towards the need 
for certainty than the latter, through an active interest in obtaining scientific evidence of ‘the other 
side’. 
The search for identity and meaning has been seen by sociologists and psychologists as a period 
during which individuals grapple with a range of uncertainties in their personal lives and social 
worlds. The flight to political or religious stability, certainty or resolution may, for some, form part 
of this quest. We will consider this below, in relation to conversion to Islam. Taking a step back, it 
is important first to situate the spiritual and ideological quest in the broader theoretical context of 
social research on uncertainty. 
The German scholar, Monica Wohlrab-Sahr (1992, 1993), placed the concept of Biographische 
Unsicherheit or biographical uncertainty on the sociological agenda in the early 1990s, giving it a 
new twist in the context of reflexive modernity (Beck 1992). Deinstitutionalization, she suggested, 
had contributed to the individualizing of biographies, placing the onus on individuals to make sense 
of a life-course which may no longer go according to plan. Zinn (2004) then explored this further in 
an examination of the drive for certainty and the expectations and action strategies adopted in 
pursuit of it. Focusing on health, risk and the life-course, he distinguished between ‘certainty 
constructions’ and the ‘protective actions’ undertaken in response to them (Zinn 2004: 202-203). In 
research on young people entering an increasingly uncertain labour market, Reiter (2010: 2) then 
turned from the life-course as a whole to transitions within it: ‘Transitions are (extended) moments 
of biographical change where individuals within certain biographical, social and material situations 
establish expectations on the basis of their experiences and other forms of knowledge available to 
them.’ Uncertainties, he suggested, are generated when such expectations are confounded, 
especially in times of rapid change or upheaval such as the financial crisis. In an empirically-
grounded model of biographical uncertainty, he (2010: 12-13) distinguished three dimensions: the 
uncertainty of knowledge; the uncertainty of outcomes; and recognition uncertainty (assessing one’s 
biographical actions relationally, on the basis of recognised norms). He concluded that ‘the 
observable core of biographical uncertainty consists of the negotiation of biographical action and 
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projection by meaningfully linking experience (PAST) to expectations (FUTURE) […] within 
a changeable biographical situation (TRANSITION)’.2 
Key to Reiter’s (2010) understanding of biographical uncertainty is the notion of a ‘biographical 
time perspective’, that sense of time progression that individuals draw on as they consider past, 
present and future, and that leads them to deploy concepts of biographical cause and effect. In 
research on conversion to Islam, scholars have drawn attention to converts’ narration of past 
experiences, present expectations and future hopes. Reference is often made to biographical crises 
of one kind or another, in relation to drug dependency, family break-up, professional insecurity, and 
deaths of friends and family members (e.g. Suleiman 2015, van Nieuwkerk 2012, Wohlrab-Sahr 
1999, 2006).  
Wohlrab-Sahr (2006: 80) builds on her earlier work in arguing for the importance of biographical 
background for an understanding of ‘conversion as a change of worldview and life-orientation’. In a 
study of Western women who convert to Islam, she offers a tripartite typology of the problem areas 
they face: gender and sexual relations; social mobility; and nationality and ethnicity (Wohlrab-Sahr 
2006: 80-81). Conversion to Islam enables women to deal with the uncertainties arising from these 
issues, and helps them find solutions. For example, for those who experience personal devaluation 
in relation to issues of gender or sexuality, conversion offers new boundaries and modes of conduct, 
and thereby a potential revaluation of the self. Similarly, for those who struggle to make social, 
economic or professional progress, conversion to Islam may bring stabilization through an 
‘alternative career’ and, for those experiencing ‘precarious belonging’, conversion may sweep away 
old affiliations and identities and offer connection to the global umma (Wohlrab-Sahr 2006: 81). 
Conversion, writes Wohlrab-Sahr (1999: 359) ‘deals with a biographically relevant problem and 
presents a specific form of solution’. 
In her study of young Muslim and Christian women in London who turn to Salafism, a conservative 
form of Islam, Anabel Inge (2017) discusses both the precipitating factors and the positive features 
that Salafism is thought to offer. She does not restrict her discussion to the biographical 
uncertainties arising from past personal experiences, however, but considers those faced during the 
transition process that relate to Islam itself, its internal divisions, theological teachings and cultural 
forms. As emerging adults in the process of going to university, making new friends and carving 
out new identities, the young women interviewed by Inge spoke of their confusion about different 
sects, sources of information, authority figures and rulings, and what was prohibited or permitted 
(Inge 2017: 62-99). It was difficult to know who could be trusted, they said, especially as their 
                                                          
2 Author’s own capitalization. 
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journey into Salafism led to an increasing gulf between new acquaintances and old friends and 
family. Commenting on their present experiences of what Salafism offered them (Inge 2017: 90-
96), many young women referred positively to the benefits of a strong scriptural stance, an 
uncompromising approach, soteriological assurance, and clear guidance and purpose in life. They 
mentioned purity, truth, and authenticity. One ‘no longer felt lost’ (Inge 2016: 95); another stated, 
‘the truth is so clear […] – this is it’ (Inge 2017: 93). A third said she experienced ‘calmness’: now 
she had found the correct path, she no longer felt confused (Inge 2017: 95).  
Following Wohlrab-Sahr (1999), we might say that, for these women, accepting Salafism had 
solved the biographical problems of ideological confusion and sectarian indeterminacy. They were 
not limited by the solace of present certainties, however, but looked forward to the promise of the 
future: ‘I just wanna get to janna, I just wanna get to paradise’ (Inge 2017: 98): ‘the best thing about 
Salafiyya is knowing that the way I’m trying to practise Islam isn’t going [to be] in vain.’ (Inge 
2017: 94) Converts to Salafism also found uncertainties about mortality and immortality addressed.  
Whilst in the sociology of religion it is generally uncertainties arising from social change that are 
thought to lead people to take refuge in the certainty and authority of religion, the dominant position 
in social psychology is that individuals turn to religion to reduce personal uncertainty. In line with 
this, researchers have focused in particular on uncertainty and religious zeal, paths to moral 
certainty, ideology and the need for cognitive closure, religious leadership and uncertainty 
reduction, and religious groups and uncertainty-identity theory.  
In a wide-ranging and authoritative article on religion and uncertainty, Hogg et al (2010: 76) draw 
on a variety of social psychological research evidence to support claims that ‘people turn to religion 
when times are uncertain or when they feel uncertain about themselves and their worldviews’, that 
‘religious identification and adherence to a religious ideology help “believers” deal with stress, 
anxiety, and trauma’, and further that there is ‘neural evidence of an association between 
religiousness and reduced uncertainty’. Their specific contribution concerns religions as social 
groups that offer individuals the means of uncertainty reduction. The substance of their argument is 
that, 
[…] religions have attributes that make them well suited to reduce feelings of self-
uncertainty. According to uncertainty-identity theory, people are motivated to reduce 
feelings of uncertainty about or reflecting on self; and identification with groups, 
particularly highly entitative groups, is a very effective way to reduce uncertainty. All 
groups provide belief systems and normative prescriptions related to everyday life. 
However, religions also address the nature of existence, invoking sacred entities and 
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associated rituals and ceremonies. They are entitative groups that provide a moral 
compass and rules for living that pervade a person’s life, making them particularly 
attractive in times of uncertainty. (Hogg et al 2010: 72)3 
Hogg et al also consider the impact of ‘strong’ religious identification and extreme behaviours and 
beliefs, citing Dunn’s (1998) argument that ‘rigid ideological systems are particularly attractive in a 
postmodern world of moral and behavioral relativities and “limitless” choice’ (Hogg et al 2010: 77). 
They do not rely on the research of others, however; for the link between uncertainty, religion and 
extremism, they cite experiments by Hogg and associates in which ‘participants showed greater 
support for and identification with the radical group under elevated uncertainty, and endorsed more 
extreme group behaviors’ (Hogg et al 2010: 78). They acknowledge that all groups may be prone to 
extremism when faced with increased uncertainty, but suggest that religious groups may be more so 
because their structure and ‘normative and ideological reach’ provide them with the tools to deal 
effectively with the uncertainties they face (Hogg et al 2010: 79). 
The relationship between extremism and the psychology of uncertainty is addressed explicitly in a 
volume edited by Hogg & Blaylock (2012a). In their introduction, the editors ask whether 
‘uncertainty might psychologically cause extremism’ (Hogg & Blaylock 2012b: xxv). Finding that 
it can, they stipulate the need for a better understanding of the types of uncertainty involved, the 
different forms of extremism and the psychological process that links the two. A useful distinction 
is made between ‘the cold-cognitive epistemic dimension’ of uncertainty, associated with meaning 
making, planning and prediction, and ‘the hot-cognitive affective dimension’ involving anxieties 
about self-identity and the future (Hogg & Blaylock 2012b: xxiii), although it is not yet clear to the 
authors which contributes most in terms of motivation.  
The social psychologists who contribute to Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty (Hogg & 
Blaylock 2012a) draw a range of interconnected conclusions from their research. Although we do 
not have the space to discuss them in depth or engage with them critically, there is some value in 
summarising their views: goal frustration and uncertainty lead to religious zeal (McGregor et al 
2012); identity uncertainty leads to extremism (Hogg 2012); the need for cognitive closure 
contributes to ‘group centrism’ and is linked to personality traits that lead to extremist views 
(Kruglanski and Orehek 2012); extremist ideological systems reduce uncertainty and leaders play a 
key role (Hogg 2012); leaders use group uncertainty to consolidate their control (Seyranian 2012); 
moral certainty contributes to violent extremist acts in which victims are removed from moral 
consideration (Giner-Sorolla et al 2012); and reducing uncertainty helps prevent group violence 
                                                          
3 By ‘entitativity’, Hogg (2012: 23) means those properties of a group which make it ‘groupy’: ‘resting on clear 
boundaries, internal homogeneity, social interaction, clear internal structure, common goals, and common fate’. 
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(Staub 2012). Drawing the volume to a close, Staub (2012: 277) concludes that ‘it is reducing 
uncertainty and fulfilling basic needs by constructive means, such as effectively addressing difficult 
life conditions and group conflict, constructive ideologies, and membership in constructive groups, 
that help prevent group violence’. 
Sociologists of religion have also deliberated on the link between religious extremism and 
uncertainty, especially in relation to minority movements and the move to violence. Following a 
series of violent events involving new religious movements in the 1990s, scholars asked what led 
groups such as the Branch Davidians, the Order of the Solar Temple, Aum Shinrikyo and Heaven’s 
Gate to resort either to collective suicide or to acts of violence against outsiders. As well as offering 
detailed case studies (e.g. Lifton 2000, Mayer 1996, Tabor & Gallagher 1995, Zeller 2014), some 
compared cases or developed frameworks and typologies to identify and distinguish between 
precipitating factors or ideological types (e.g. Bromley & Melton 2002, Walliss 2004, Wessinger 
2000a). Historical cases – including the Mormons, Nazism and the People’s Temple – were also 
considered, both as precedents and as comparative examples (Hunt 2001, Wessinger 2000b).  
It is important to situate ‘uncertainty’ in the sociological worldview of those scholars who discussed 
such cases, given that they exploited alternative concepts to frame or focus their research: some 
utilised ideological perspectives such as apocalypticism or millenarianism, others used political 
concepts such as persecution or conspiracy, or explanatory terms associated with modernity, such as 
fragmentation or alienation. Returning to the case of Aum Shinrikyo, whilst scholars have clearly 
favoured their own analytical frameworks, we suggest that using the framework of 
uncertainty/certainty can help illuminate how both individual members and the group as a whole 
interpreted and sought to cope with internal and external challenges.  
Aum scholars (e.g. Lifton 2000, Reader 2000, Shimazono 1995) have diagnosed the push factors 
that drove young, well-educated seekers to join as dissatisfaction with the materialism and values of 
Japanese society, doubts about scientific rationalism, and alienation from a highly competitive 
education system and working environment. Simultaneously, they have noted the social and 
spiritual certainties that drew followers to Aum: strong leadership, a disciplined path, a clear 
message of salvation and ‘solace in the face of the final war which, it was prophesied, would engulf 
the world’ (Reader 2000: 103). These authors have also referred to the volatility and increasing 
instability of Asahara and his leadership, from 1988 onwards. Reader (2000: 184), in particular, has 
used the concept of failure, to signal that the group’s expectations – of growth, legal status and 
political power – were not being met. He and others have described how perceptions of persecution 
and tensions inside Aum ‘grew virtually to breaking point’ (Reader 2000), with the term 
11 
 
‘Armageddon’ repeatedly used to convey the sense of emergency experienced within the group 
(Francis 2011, Shimazono 1995). 
Within a framework of millennialism, millenarianism or apocalypticism, other authors have noted 
similar factors regarding the external uncertainties and internal fragmentation and doubt 
experienced by members of minority religions (and have often narrated these in similar ways). 
Some have focused on the significance of external factors as the drivers of paranoia, a sense of 
persecution and extreme actions in a fragile group (Bromley & Melton 2002, Walliss 2004, 
Wessinger 2000a). Mayer (2001: 366), however, placed more stress on internal dissent and protest 
as potential triggers for violence, suggesting that the very ‘structure of plausibility’ might be called 
into question once members began to have doubts about the beliefs or activities of their leader or 
other members. 
Group responses to internal and external uncertainties are reflected in the models and typologies 
developed by scholars for analysing millennial movements. Wessinger (2000a; 2000b), for 
example, distinguishes between progressive and catastrophic millennialism to reflect differences in 
beliefs about how the ‘millennial kingdom is expected to be accomplished’ (2000b: 8), with 
catastrophic millennialism focused around a ‘dramatic denouement’ (Bromley and Melton 2002: 4) 
that will destroy the world and allow the elect to be saved. Wessinger (2000a: 17-24, 2000b: 3-39) 
identifies three group types according to the nature of their engagement with violence. 
‘Revolutionary millennial movements’, both political and religious, believe that violence is justified 
as a response to persecution and as a means to liberation and the hastening of right government and 
an ideal society. ‘Assaulted millennial groups’ are marked out by the fact that it is external agents 
that initiate the cycle of violence (though they share many of the same features as the other types in 
terms of their convictions, sense of persecution, rejection of the current order and preparation for 
conflict). The third type – which includes Aum and most of the major cases mentioned earlier – is 
‘fragile millennial groups’, noted for acting violently in response to external opposition, internal 
failings and tensions, or both. They display chaotic millennialist beliefs, are radically dualistic and 
prone to conspiratorial thinking; they exercise a growing inwardness and a high degree of internal 
control. It is in this last group that the impact of external and internal uncertainties seems to be most 
marked. 
An alternative framework for understanding the ‘apocalyptic trajectories’ pursued by religious 
minorities which turn violent is provided by Walliss (2004: 231-232). Focusing specifically on 
violent groups with apocalyptic beliefs and a theology of the End Times, he identifies exogenous 
and endogenous precipitating factors, mapping these in terms of (a) the actions of cultural 
opponents, (b) challenges to the leader’s authority and charisma, and (c) internal challenges to the 
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millennial goal (e.g. defection and dissent leading to an inability to fulfil the group’s ambitions). Of 
the six groups examined by Walliss (2004: 242-243), four ‘have been made fragile by either a 
combination of internal pressures and external opposition […] or by internal factors alone’.  
Walliss (2004: 245) draws attention to an important point, that ‘real violence […] can result from 
imagined opposition and perceived persecution’ as much as from actual external pressures. This is 
critical for understanding how uncertainties, especially those arising from the outside world, impact 
on a group’s identity, beliefs and actions. Uncertainties are experienced and felt in the minds and 
bodies of individuals; they then thrive in the social and cultural life of the collective. Groups project 
uncertainties – in the form of conspiracies, dualistic oppositions, and persecution – onto outsiders 
and their intentions.  
Wessinger’s typology is backward-looking, whereas Walliss’s has more of a future orientation. 
Whilst it is only possible to assign a group to one of Wessinger’s three types after violence has been 
triggered (either by the group itself or by its opponents); the focus on precipitating factors in 
Walliss’s typology has some potential for identifying warning signs in real time. As we will see 
below, the contributors to this volume, whilst identifying similar factors, go beyond the 
identification of causes to examining how individuals and groups respond to the uncertainties they 
face and develop relevant solutions. 
 
Interpreting minority religions and their problems, responses and solutions through the 
frame of uncertainty 
In the invitation to contribute to this volume and the INFORM seminar and book symposium which 
preceded it, we asked what happens when groups lose control of their own destiny, noting that 
uncertainty can lead to change in the mission and even in the teachings of religious and other 
ideological groups. We drew attention to the variety of uncertainties faced by groups, some 
external, for example legal challenges to religious status; some ideological, such as an imminent 
apocalyptic event; and some internal, such as the defection of members or challenges to leadership. 
In order to gain an understanding of the variety of causes and responses to uncertainty we invited 
contributors to consider historical as well as contemporary, and non-religious as well as religious 
cases, and where appropriate to compare or contrast them. We were interested in how groups 
resolved uncertainties, and in what strategies or innovations they adopted to stabilize the situation 
or reassert a collective sense of certainty or success. Were they adaptable or resilient in the face of 
change? Did uncertainties lead to expulsions, schism, acts of violence, or to world-rejection? Or did 
groups respond by reforming, engaging with outsiders or reinterpreting events? 
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Case studies and issues 
Of the minorities examined in this volume, the majority are religious or spiritual, though several are 
ideological subcultures operating in volatile political contexts, including British Fascists in the 
Second World War in Britain (Macklin), the punk movement in the Northern Ireland troubles 
(Stewart), and MOVE – an environmental movement – in 1980s Philadelphia (Fiscella). Ardovini 
examines the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that also operated as a political organisation. 
Beliefs, values, commitments and emotions are no less evident in the responses of these groups to 
uncertainty than in the religious cases. The religious minorities treated here span a range of 
religious traditions (Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam) as well as old and new spiritual 
formations such as esotericism, New Age, and organised new religious movements (including 
Scientology, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness or ISKCON, and Japanese new 
religions). A network of religious organisations, the Inter Faith Network (IFN) for the UK is also 
treated (van Twist). The chapters deal with a variety of contexts, from the UK and US, to Japan and 
Egypt, with others discussing global movements.  
Whilst all the authors deal with twentieth and twenty-first century movements and issues, several 
focus explicitly on historical cases or change over time (Ardovini, Barrett, Macklin, Stewart, 
Weightman). As they suggest, responses to uncertainty at an early stage may differ to those at a 
later one, as political circumstances, public attitudes and a group’s internal conditions change. 
Several authors discuss how particular religious minorities deal with profound internal challenges, 
such as the death of the founder (Burt on ISKCON) and dramatic doctrinal change (Barrett on the 
Worldwide Church of God and its various splinter groups). Others focus on those that have faced 
significant external problems, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ardovini), which had to 
weather the ongoing storm of challenges to its legal status and from wider state repression, and 
Kofuku no kagaku, a Japanese new religion (Baffelli) that, like Aum Shinrikyo, had to cope with 
the failure of its various political, social and educational projects. The practical and policy 
responses of the Church of Scientology to its legal, charitable and media controversies are explored 
by Weightman, himself a member and previous Director of European Human Rights for the Church. 
Several authors consider more than one group, with Newcombe examining the conflict within 
contemporary Tibetan Buddhism between Shugden activists and Dalai Lama supporters, Robertson 
comparing the use of conspiracy narratives as a prevention strategy by two new religious 
movements, and Fiscella contrasting the uncertainty diffusion strategies of a religious group (the 
Unitarian Universalist Association or UUA) with those of a state actor (the City of Philadelphia). 
Sieg considers how different esoteric minority religions respond to uncertainty and change, 
compares them with exoteric religions, and seeks to identify the conditions that lead a group to react 
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violently. Van Twist, focusing on a network founded to respond to the uncertainties of religious 
legitimacy in an age of increasing secularization and pluralization, examines the reaction of the IFN 
and its member bodies (local interfaith groups and religious organisations) to a new equality agenda 
and to challenges to its membership policy and criteria.   
In the remainder of this final section, we will build on the conceptual and theoretical developments 
identified in the literature with evidence from the book’s case studies. We will advance the 
sociology of uncertainty by examining how ideological minorities respond to external and internal 
challenges and, in many cases, find tailored solutions. 
External and internal uncertainties faced by groups 
A major area addressed in the chapters that follow is the nature and source of the external and 
internal uncertainties faced by religious and other ideological groups (rather than the types of 
uncertainty, though Newcombe notes existential challenges, Macklin, psychological uncertainty, 
and Robertson, epistemic seclusion; cf. Tannert et al 2007). This makes sense in the context of 
empirical case studies where specificity is more important than generalisation. What is clear though 
is that certain sources are evident in multiple case studies – something we can attribute to the 
pattern of public responses to new and minority religions more generally. These sources include the 
state (Ardovini, Fiscella), the legal and charity sectors (Weightman, van Twist), security and 
intelligence agencies (Fiscella, Macklin, Robertson, Stewart), the media (Baffelli, Weightman), 
churches (Weightman), politics and politicians (Ardovini, Baffelli, Stewart), other cognate groups 
(Barrett, Newcombe, van Twist), ex-members, families and anti-cult groups (Barrett, Stewart, 
Weightman), and even aliens (Robertson). Walliss (2004: 231) refers to such sources as a group’s 
‘cultural opponents’. 
Minority religions and other ideological groups often find themselves in opposition – ideologically, 
theologically, morally or socially – to public authorities and interest groups, and such opposition 
may well contribute to feelings of uncertainty, pressure, persecution and a loss of control of the 
group’s future (Baffelli). Like Walliss (2004) and Reader (2000), Robertson, writing on conspiracy 
narratives, notes that what is important is how groups understand the threats and counter-agents 
working against them, not whether such threats or agents are a reality. Perceived persecution and a 
mounting sense of paranoia may be more important than actual attitudes or attacks, though the latter 
can also be deeply felt (e.g. the stigma of disloyalty experienced by British fascists, in Macklin). 
Sieg, however, in his chapter on esotericism, stresses that in the late-modern West, few esoteric 
groups experience significant opposition from society or construct narratives of such opposition. 
15 
 
The uncertainties they experience tend to be those that result from time and context, that is, the 
anomie and global uncertainties common to the age (cf. Bauman 2007). 
Burt and Barrett, in particular, consider the internal uncertainties faced by groups. Burt 
comprehensively examines challenges and anxieties within ISKCON following the death of the 
founder and a subsequent period of leadership by senior figures (zonal gurus). She sets these within 
the context of the movement’s ‘foundations of certainty’ (the legacy of tradition together with a 
modern managerial structure), showing that, although these foundations did not prevent problems 
arising, they did form the basis for members to bring about their eventual resolution. In Barrett’s 
case, disagreements arose within the Worldwide Church of God following the death of the founder 
and the imposition of drastic doctrinal changes that more or less reversed the Church’s theological 
position and challenged its ‘structure of plausibility’ (Mayer 2001: 366). These led members to 
break away and create new groups, generating a cycle of defection and re-affiliation.  
These two cases expose the uncertainties that arise around leadership issues within minority 
religions, especially following the death of the founder. The authors also recognise that the 
instability caused by such a transition is dynamic: it shifts and changes over time as members of the 
group respond and seek a solution. As Reiter noted (2010: 13) of biographical uncertainty, people 
negotiate challenging transitions by linking their past experience to what they expect in future. As 
the cases of ISKCON and the Worldwide Church of God suggest, members drew on existing 
knowledge (e.g. from tradition, teachings, institutions) in order to establish expectations; they then 
sought to bring the future under control in line with their expected outcomes (e.g. through 
institutional reform, schism or defection). 
Individual and group level responses to uncertainty 
Many of those who have written about uncertainty have not only been interested in how individuals 
and groups experience it, but in how they respond to it (e.g. Hogg et al 2010, Hogg 2012, McGregor 
et al 2012, Walliss 2004, Wessinger 2000a), especially if their response involves extremism or 
violence. Reader (2000), Lifton (2000) and others dissected how, over a period of time, antipathy 
towards cultural opponents and the failure of its objectives led Aum Shinrikyo into a cycle of 
paranoia, world-rejection, severe asceticism and violence. As we will see, however, groups do not 
always respond to uncertainties by adopting such strategies.  
Although the case studies that follow do not prioritize individual actors, they nevertheless illustrate 
some of the affective, cognitive and behavioural responses of individuals to uncertainty. For 
example, in his historical analysis of British Fascism, Macklin argues that ‘the psychological impact 
of internment is thus only readily comprehensible if one takes seriously the emotional aspects of the 
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experience for fascist activists through which they sought to interpret, mitigate and overcome’ the 
impact of uncertainty. He describes the effect on the mental health of internees, noting complaints 
of disorientation, isolation and powerlessness. Others felt frustrated or defiant. He also notes that, 
whilst many dissociated themselves from the British Union of Fascists, others ‘intensified their 
beliefs, a process accompanied by a sense of spiritual cleansing or personal rebirth of the activist 
himself’. 
Cognitive responses to uncertainty are discussed by Robertson who, drawing on examples of New 
Age writers, illustrates how conspiracy narratives are developed as a means of explaining the failure 
of prophecy: ‘For some, the New Age is still imminent, but held at bay by a malevolent hidden 
hand.’ Whilst these New Agers deal with uncertainty through narrative innovation, the Tibetan 
Buddhists in Newcombe’s account cope with it by hardening their attitudes, making claims and 
counter-claims, and participating in rhetorical amplification. Supporters and detractors of Shugden 
materialize their opposing beliefs in public protest and at times material violence. 
Other forms of individual behavioural reaction to uncertainty include negative responses such as 
disengagement from spiritual practice or defection. Barrett, for example, notes that ex-members of 
the Worldwide Church of God developed a pattern of disaffiliation: once they had rebelled against 
Church authorities once, they were less concerned about doing so a second time. Positive responses 
are also noted, such as the use of ritual or magic to regain control and stabilize the situation (Burt, 
Sieg), or desistance from drugs and alcohol, and participation in community and social activism 
(Stewart) in order to find meaning through personal commitment and shared values.  
It is group level responses to uncertainty that feature most prominently in the book’s case studies. In 
the following grid we have clustered these by responses to internal or external uncertainties and the 
open or closed nature of a group’s response. 
 Responses to internal 
uncertainties 
 






• Diagnosis of problems 
• Self-correction (by group) 
• Flexible and innovative 
approaches to goals 
• Reformist impulses 
• Dealing with existential 
challenges 
• Public acceptance of problems 
• Focus on external communications 
• Seeking to work with others 
• Development of external facing 
bodies 




• Criticism of leaders by 
members 
• Counselling of members 
• Open defections 
• Fission/schism 
OI 
• Participation in dialogue 
• Inviting outsiders in (e.g. media, 
parents) 
• Community and social activism 







• Group denial  
• Failure to respond or 
change 
• Inflexible approach to 
goals 
• Authoritarian crackdown 
• Intensification of ascetic 
practices 
• Violence within the group 
• Failure to deal with trauma 
of members 
• Development of inner 
circle 
• Targeting of critical 
members 
• Secrecy 
• Hidden defections 
CI 
• Increasingly dualistic rhetoric 
• Development of conspiracy 
narratives 
• Issuing of public threats 
• Eventual cessation of 
communications 
• Withdrawing from external bodies 
• Cutting links with outsiders (e.g. 
family members) 
• Turning inward; increasing world-
rejection  
• Exclusionary practices 
• Breaking the law 
• Weapons stock-piling 
• Violence against outsiders 
CE 
Table 1: Open and closed responses by minority religions and other ideological groups to 
internal and external uncertainties 
The four cells in the table represent open responses to internal uncertainties (OI), open responses to 
external uncertainties (OE), closed responses to external uncertainties (CE) and closed responses to 
internal uncertainties (CI). We will illustrate each of these with reference to the responses of one or 
more of the groups featured in the book.  
Earlier, we drew attention to Burt’s and Barrett’s studies of ISKCON and the Worldwide Church of 
God which featured internal uncertainties. These new religious movements exemplify the first of 
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these clusters (OI, top left quadrant), because they offer open responses to internal problems (see 
also Macklin, and Fiscella on the UUA). In the case of ISKCON, Burt explains a responsive process 
of ‘self-correction’ in which the organisation was able to draw on its traditions and well-established 
management structure to move forward after the death of the founder. Although this process was 
contested, leaders did take responsibility and eventually listened to members who successfully 
organised themselves and pressed for change. Although a minority left, this was not on the scale 
experienced over several decades by the Worldwide Church of God. Barrett records that ministers 
and members responded to enforced doctrinal changes, brought in by the new leader after the death 
of the founder, by leaving and setting up alternative churches which maintained the old teachings 
rather than adopting the new ones. Defection and schism became the accepted response to doctrinal 
differences. 
Moving now to open responses to external uncertainties (OE, top right quadrant), Van Twist, 
writing on the UK’s Inter Faith Network (IFN), and Stewart, on the punk movement, provide the 
clearest examples (but see also Ardovini, Baffelli). With the ear of Government and support from 
mainstream religious denominations in the UK, the IFN was, for several decades, the voice of 
authority on issues of religious diversity and interfaith engagement. However, in a context of 
political and legal change, flexibility was required as equality issues came to the fore, new religious 
voices demanded a hearing, and controversies occurred over issues of inclusion and representation. 
The IFN had to find ways to tackle membership issues and respond to allegations of extremism. 
Allowing in new member bodies and refreshing the Trustee Board helped to conciliate existing 
members, whilst embracing rather than alienating critics.  
Turning now to a very different example from the social and political periphery rather than centre of 
UK public life, Straight Edge was a punk response to the political and social uncertainties 
experienced by young people growing up in Northern Ireland in the 1980s. As Stewart suggests, 
although it was marked by ‘hardcore’ music and extreme beliefs and identities, and could hardly be 
said to represent the ideological mainstream, it nevertheless established itself as ‘a direct challenge 
to the bitter sectarian division and lack of choice within the country’. It responded with a 
commitment to communal engagement and social change rather than participation in violent action. 
Here was an outwardly extreme movement that sought change through an alternative, critical 
politics of music and activism rather than via the paramilitary route adopted by others. 
In terms of closed responses to internal and external uncertainties (CI, bottom left quadrant, and CE, 
bottom right quadrant), Sieg and Baffelli illustrate these through cross comparisons. Sieg 
distinguishes between esoteric groups on the basis to whether or not they respond with violence, 
and whether that violence is internal or external. Most esoteric groups which exhibit moral dualism 
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resist the path of external violence (CE), unless they also adhere to eschatological or apocalyptic 
dualism. He cites Scientology as an example of the former, though he suggests that it has used what 
he refers to as ‘personal or organisational violence’ internally (CI); the Church of the Latter-day 
Saints is offered as an example of a group that at one stage combined moral and eschatological 
dualism and resorted to external violence through armed resistance to perceived US federal 
government persecution (CE). Baffelli juxtaposes Kofuku no kagaku, a Japanese new religion 
which adopted a broadly open response to the external challenges it faced (OE), to Aum Shinrikyo, 
a group which responded by turning inwards and countenancing violence towards both insiders and 
outsiders (CI, CE). Closed responses to external uncertainties are also discussed by Robertson and 
Newcombe. We will return to their analyses in the final section below. 
The case studies in this volume illustrate the importance of two other factors in assessing responses 
to uncertainty. One is change over time, and the other is the active role of cultural opponents 
(Walliss 2004). In terms of the former, studies by Weightman, Robertson and Seig of Scientology 
show that the group has responded to external uncertainties in different ways at different times, 
moving backwards and forwards between closed and open responses (CE, OE): the development of 
conspiracy narratives and a growing sense of persecution are examples of closed responses; the 
establishment of an external affairs department and the pursuit of legal legitimacy are examples of 
open responses.  
Regarding the impact of cultural opponents on groups and their capacity to respond to uncertainty, 
Fiscella explores the interaction between MOVE and the City of Philadelphia which, following a 
series of losses (deaths of police officers and failure to prosecute MOVE), eventually led to the 
City’s violent intervention. Ardovini, who also tracks how the Muslim Brotherhood’s responses 
change over time, charts the role of the state in repressing the group and in withdrawing its legal 
status. As she makes clear, the responses of a group to such uncertainties do not occur in a vacuum. 
They are affected by public interactions and the actions and threats of others, whether by cognate 
groups (Barrett, Newcombe), the media and other cultural critics (Baffelli, Van Twist, Weightman), 
families (Stewart), external advisors (Burt), or the state (Ardovini, Fiscella). 
Solutions to the problem of uncertainty 
As our earlier review showed, sociologists and social psychologists have considered the impact of 
uncertainty on both individuals and groups, and the contributors to this book have added examples 
and further insights. Although at times there has been clear evidence from earlier research of a 
relationship between religion and the need for certainty (e.g. Hogg 2010; Inge 2017), other 
researchers have found that living with doubt and uncertainty, and understanding the limits of what 
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can be known and controlled, can be just as important (Claverie & Fedele 2014, Knibbe 2014). In 
this volume, although there are no cases as explicit as Knibbe’s (2014) liberal Catholics, for whom 
embracing uncertainty had proved liberating, there were cases of religious or political actors 
individually or collectively addressing uncertainties with ritual (ISKCON), magic (esoteric 
practitioners), communal action (punks), mediation (Unitarian Universalist Association), or 
structural change (the Inter Faith Network). As Claverie and Fedele (2014: 490) stated, ‘uncertainty 
and doubt are inherent in lived religion and play an important role in the ongoing process of 
construction of religious rituals and narratives.’ Contributors to this volume have confirmed that. 
The punks in Stewart’s study are a prime example. By deliberately resisting the destinies expected 
of them – of addiction, sectarian politics or paramilitary activity – a small group forged an 
alternative path and made a conscious commitment to ‘Straight Edge’. They responded to the 
familiar uncertainties of drug and alcohol abuse, communal hostilities and routine violence by 
claiming a marginal lifestyle: no drink, no drugs, no casual sex, in a context where these were the 
norm, and the pursuit of an alternative, authentic self in an environment of established sectarian 
identities. Like Islam for Wohlrab-Sahr’s converts, Straight Edge culture was  
[…] a means for the public dramatization of problems of social disintegration and 
distinction. But it also functions as a means of individual problem-solving, because it 
re-evaluates the former weak points in the biography, and replaces the old relations by a 
new, absolute commitment. (Wohlrab-Sahr 1999: 321) 
As this case shows, the art of dealing successfully with uncertainties is to identify a fitting solution 
that works for the group and the individuals involved. But not all solutions are rational, that is, 
related to the problems or uncertainties they are designed to address (Wohlrab-Sahr 2006). 
Sometimes uncertainty responses are denials, blind alleys or simply off target. In these cases, the 
problems deriving from uncertainty may not be resolved.  
Newcombe, for example, concludes that, for the two opposing Tibetan Buddhist groups in her 
study, socio-political accusations and protest are a distraction from their existential concerns: ‘For 
both groups, their experience of Shugden and/or the Dalai Lama is central to their Buddhist faith 
and understanding of their place in the world.’ Neither can afford to give up their position as to do 
so would endanger the very beliefs and rituals which anchor them in the present and future. They 
are trapped in a reciprocal cycle of ideological claims and counter-claims. Attempts at dialogue 
have been made, but, according to Newcombe, the two sides remain interlocked in a rhetorical 
struggle from which they cannot escape.  
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This example of ‘no solution’ can be juxtaposed by another in which rhetoric, or more properly 
narrative, becomes part of the solution. Building on Festinger et al’s (1956) fourfold analysis of 
how groups seek to reduce cognitive dissonance when prophecy fails, Robertson offers a fifth 
strategy, that of prevention. He suggests that groups deal with the uncertainties of epistemic 
seclusion by developing conspiracy narratives which explain how and why an expected event was 
prevented from happening, and by whom. An internal failure can then be turned outwards and 
blamed upon others. This offers an innovative solution to problems that might otherwise result in an 
internal leadership challenge, defections or a loss of group cohesion. 
Finally we return to the case of Aum. In her analysis of the Japanese new religions, Aum Shinrikyo 
and Kofuku no kagaku, Baffelli (cf. Baffelli & Reader 2011) shows how the two reacted to a similar 
set of external circumstances with differing psychological and ideological responses and practical 
strategies. She compares how they explained their failures. Whilst Kofuku no Kagaku was able ‘to 
drop its aggressive millennialism and reorient itself into a more optimistic view of the world, Aum 
Shinrikyo became increasingly isolated and its apocalyptic prophecies even more dramatic’. The 
solution adopted by the former was to meet its political and educational failures with success, by 
setting achievable goals, being flexible, pursuing the ‘science of happiness’, and adjusting its 
rhetorical strategy to suit the situation. Aum’s approach to its public failures was very different.  
As scholars have noted, uncertainty is often generated when goals are frustrated and expectations 
are not met. Instead of resetting its predictions, goals and expectations, Aum’s leader, Asahara, laid 
the blame for the group’s failures on outsiders. Rather than seeing external criticisms as temporary 
setbacks, he interpreted them as evidence of persecution. Aum turned inwards, and developed a 
theology that justified violence. Far from resolving its uncertainties, Aum’s trajectory led not only 
to violence and the use of a weapon of mass destruction, but also to the ultimate failure of the group 
and its mission. 
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